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Abstract 
The recent global financial crisis has triggered questions in the scientific area of capital 
structure dynamic determination regarding how “quickly” companies tend to adjust 
their capital structure to their long-term targets, in different macroeconomic states. We 
broaden the scope of the debate by focusing on SMEs and by discussing the relative 
importance of firm-specific and macroeconomic variables, when macroeconomic 
conditions change. Based on a partial adjustment model, we find that short-term and 
long-term debt ratios follow different patterns regarding their adjustment speeds; the 
adjustment speed for long-term debt slows down during the crisis, while the respective 
of the short-term debt is not affected. We also find clear differentiations of the effects 
and the contribution of the firm-specific and the macroeconomic variables between 
short-term debt and long-term debt ratios, when macroeconomic states change. We thus 
conclude that the nature and maturity of borrowing affect the persistence and endurance 
of the relationship between determinants and borrowing, across different 
macroeconomic states. 
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1. Introduction 
Capital structure determination of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) is a 
scientific area that has drawn much of research interest mainly during the last two 
decades. This is partly because of the recognition of the importance of SMEs for the 
economy in terms of numbers of enterprises, employment and value added, and partly 
because of the acknowledgement that SMEs financing exhibits considerable differences 
when compared to large enterprises. Consequently, a series of research has emerged, 
especially during the last twenty years that focuses on investigating the particularities 
of small enterprises in their capital structure determination. 
Specifically, Torrès and Julien (2005) tackle this issue from a managerial perspective 
and describe the main findings of researchers over the last 30 years that have led to the 
recognition of SMEs specificities. Capital structure theory cannot be an exemption of 
this wide recognition, where research has shown that large firms’ theory has limited 
applicability to SMEs. This approach was first highlighted by Ang (1991), who points 
out that the theory of finance was not developed with the small business in mind, while 
Cressy and Olofsson (1997) state that small businesses are not “scaled-down versions” 
of large businesses, and Michaelas et al. (1999) attempt to relate the different theoretical 
attributes to small firms. 
On the other hand, Hackbarth et al. (2006) denoted that, despite the substantial 
development of the capital structure literature, little attention has been paid to the 
effects of macroeconomic conditions on credit risk and capital structure choices. The 
recent global financial crisis has triggered questions in the scientific area of capital 
structure determination regarding how “quickly” companies tend to adjust their capital 
structure to their long-term targets, in different economic states. Cook and Tang (2010) 
build on the findings of previous analysts (Choe et al., 1993; Gertler and Gilchrist, 
1993; Korajczyk and Levy, 2003) that macroeconomic conditions do affect firms’ 
financing choices, and show that firms adjust their leverage toward target faster in good 
macroeconomic states relative to bad states. Öztekin and Flannery (2012) compare 
capital structure speed adjustments across countries and find that legal and financial 
conditions vary with debt adjustment speeds. Baum et al. (2016) follow a similar 
approach and show that firms with financial surpluses and above-target leverage adjust 
their leverage more rapidly when firm-specific risk is low and when macroeconomic 
risk is high, while firms with financial deficits and below-target leverage adjust their 
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capital structure more quickly when both types of risk are low. It is exactly the context 
of Baum et al. (2016) which triggers the main idea of this paper, namely to investigate 
the relative importance of traditional firm-specific capital structure determinants (i.e. 
asset structure, size, profitability, risk, growth etc.) versus macroeconomic variables, 
when macroeconomic states change.  
None of the afore-mentioned studies simultaneously combine SMEs’ specificities 
with adjustment speed in capital structure determination and explore the issue of firm-
specific vs. macroeconomic variables in different economic states. The main research 
objective of this paper is thus to contribute to the interesting debate of the relative 
importance of firm-specific vs. macroeconomic variables when macroeconomic 
conditions change, seen respectively in a demand-driven vs. supply-driven context, in 
the SMEs environment.  
We identify two periods of different macroeconomic states (growth and recession) 
and mainly follow the methodological rationale of Cook and Tang (2010) and Öztekin 
and Flannery (2012), using a dynamic partial adjustment capital structure model with 
unobserved heterogeneity and dummy variable for the macroeconomic states. Our main 
finding is that there are clear differentiations of the effects and the contribution of the 
firm-specific vs. the macroeconomic variables between short-term debt and long-term 
debt ratios, when macroeconomic states change. This finding leads to the conclusion 
that the nature and maturity of borrowing affects the persistence and endurance of the 
relationship between determinants and borrowing, across different macroeconomic 
states. 
We thus believe that the paper contributes on the recent of capital structure dynamic 
determination in the following ways: (a) we broaden the scope of the debate by 
including SMEs, (b) we show that macroeconomic states have a prevailing effect on 
how the relationships of capital structure determinants and leverage are shaped, and (c) 
we show that these relationships are also influenced by debt maturity. 
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model, the methodology, 
the variables and the data, Section 3 presents the empirical results and Section 4 
concludes the paper. 
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2. Methodology and data 
2.1. The model 
We mainly follow the rationale of Cook and Tang (2010) and Öztekin and Flannery 
(2012), using the partial adjustment model which assumes that the target debt ratio 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗  of firm 𝑖𝑖 at time 𝑡𝑡 is given by: 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗ = 𝛼𝛼∗ + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖∗ + 𝛽𝛽∗𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛾∗𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1,      𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑁𝑁, 𝑡𝑡 = 2, … ,𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖    (1) 
where 𝛼𝛼∗ is the constant term, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖∗ is the unobserved heterogeneity of firm 𝑖𝑖, 𝑋𝑋 =(𝑋𝑋1, … ,𝑋𝑋𝐾𝐾)′ and 𝑀𝑀 = (𝑀𝑀1, … ,𝑀𝑀𝐽𝐽)′ are (column) vectors of firm specific and 
macroeconomic variables respectively, 𝛽𝛽∗ = (𝛽𝛽1∗, … ,𝛽𝛽𝛫𝛫∗ ) is the (row) coefficient vector 
of the firm specific variables and 𝛾𝛾∗ = (𝛾𝛾1∗, … , 𝛾𝛾𝐽𝐽∗) the (row) coefficient vector of the 
macroeconomic variables. The debt ratio 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 adjusts to its target according to the rule: 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝛿𝛿∗�𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗ − 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡        (2) 
where 𝛿𝛿∗ is the speed of adjustment and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the error term. Solving equations (1) and 
(2) for 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 gives 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛾𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡       (3) 
where 𝛼𝛼 = 𝛿𝛿∗𝛼𝛼∗, 𝛿𝛿 = 1 − 𝛿𝛿∗, 𝛽𝛽 = 𝛿𝛿∗𝛽𝛽∗, 𝛾𝛾 = 𝛿𝛿∗𝛾𝛾∗ and 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿∗𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖∗. 
Cook and Tang (2010) estimate model (3) using panel data for US firms over the 
period 1977-2006, while Öztekin and Flannery (2012) for companies from 37 countries 
over the period 1991-2006. Cook and Tang (2010) expand further the model by 
including a dummy variable for the good and bad states of the economy and interacting 
it with the lagged debt ratio. They find that the speed of adjustment is lower in bad 
states compared to good states of the economy. Öztekin and Flannery (2012) find that 
the countries with low speed of adjustement are those with weak financial, legal and 
political institutions, not allowing however for different speeds of adjustment in 
different states. 
Since our sample period contains a good (growth) followed by a bad (recessionary) 
macroeconomic state, it is unlikely that the coefficients in (3) remain constant over 
time. Hence, we follow Cook and Tang (2010) and consider a dummy variable for the 
good and the bad states. We interact the dummy with the lagged debt ratio as in Cook 
and Tang (2010), but also with the lagged firm-specific and macroeconomic variables 
in order to investigate the effect of these distinct sets of variables to debt ratio in 
different macroeconomic states. The inclusion of these multiplicative dummies is 
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essential from a methodological perspective. Since we are considering the possibility 
that the adjustment rate 𝛿𝛿∗is different in the two periods, then the coefficients of the 
firm and macro regressors are likely to be different in the two states given that 𝛽𝛽 =
𝛿𝛿∗𝛽𝛽∗ and 𝛾𝛾 = 𝛿𝛿∗𝛾𝛾∗. 
The model becomes: 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 +
𝛾𝛾𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡       (4) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 takes the value 1 if 𝑡𝑡 is in the crisis period and 0 otherwise. Under this setup, 
the effects of the lagged debt ratio, the lagged firm-specific variables and the lagged 
macroeconomic variables on the debt ratio are given respectively by 𝛿𝛿, 𝛽𝛽 and 𝛾𝛾 in the 
good state and by 𝛿𝛿 + 𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐, 𝛽𝛽 + 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐 and 𝛾𝛾 + 𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐 in the bad state. The differences of these 
effects in the two periods are given by 𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐, 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐 and 𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐, respectively. Once we estimate 
model (4), we focus on hypothesis testing for the significance of the latter parameters 
to examine the effect of firm and macro variables on debt ratio in different states. Since 
we do find evidence that there are different effects, we further decompose the sample 
mean of debt ratio and investigate the relative contribution of the firm and macro 
variables. 
 
2.2. The Estimation Methodology 
We estimate model (4) with the two-step system generalized method of moments 
(GMM) of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). We do not 
include the dummy for the constant (i.e. set 0cα = ), since the dummy variable is highly 
collinear with some of the regressors, and drop the constant (i.e. set 𝛼𝛼 = 0) as it is found 
insignificant. We use one lag for the instruments in the GMM estimation and robust (to 
small samples) standard errors of Windmeijer (2005). The estimation method is 
designed for big N and small T dynamic panels with high autoregressive parameter, 
and while it requires the error term 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 to have no autocorrelation (so that the moments 
conditions are satisfied for performing GMM), it does not restrict it to be 
homoskedastic. 
As regards diagnostic tests, we evaluate the Wald statistic for goodness-of-fit, the 
Arellano and Bond (1991) statistic for autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals 
𝛥𝛥𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑖,𝑡𝑡, the modified Wald statistic for heteroskedasticity evaluated for the residuals 𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑖,𝑡𝑡, 
(see Greene, 2000) and the Sargan and Hansen statistics for overidentifying restrictions 
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(see Sargan, 1958, and Hansen, 1982). We also examine the fit of the model by 
evaluating the coefficient of determination 𝐷𝐷2 of model (4) for the whole period and 
the two subperiods, with and without the estimated fixed effects1. 
To evaluate the robustness of our results, we 1) allow for maximum lag in the 
instruments for the difference equation in system GMM estimation, 2) take a full 
balanced subsample of the data, 3) examine firm with total debt ratio less than 1 for all 
available years, 4) consider only firms with non-zero debt for all available years, 5) 
split the sample in the two periods, 6) replace the macro regressors by year dummies, 
and 7) consider different break point of when the crisis occurs. 
 
2.3. The variables 
2.3.1. Measurement of leverage 
We differentiate between three types of leverage, namely the total debt ratio (TDR), 
the short-term debt ratio (STDR) and the long-term debt ratio (LTDR), following a 
respective strand of literature that approaches debt maturity differentiation from 
different angles (Diamond and He, 2014; Fan et al., 2012; Fu and Subramanian, 2011. 
On SMEs: Koeter-Kant and Hernandez-Canovas, 2011; García-Teruel, and Martínez-
Solano, 2010; Michaelas et al., 1999). This differentiation allows us to examine 
influences of the debt maturity structure on leverage, across macroeconomic states.  
In terms of calculating the ratios, we follow standard practice by measuring debt 
ratios as the book value of interest-bearing debt over total assets. Thus, TDR is the sum 
of the firm’s short-term plus long-term book value of interest-bearing debt to total 
assets, while STDR and LTDR are short- and long-term debt to total assets respectively. 
2.3.2. Firm-specific factors 
We use the standard set of firm-specific capital structure determinants for SMEs. 
Asset structure (AS) is expected to be either positively related with debt levels, since 
banks require guarantees from SMEs to grant loans (Scott, 1977; Harris and Raviv, 
1990), or positively related since asset tangibility is related with a stable source of 
internally generated returns (Hall et al., 2004; Sogorb-Mira, 2005). AS is measured as 
the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. 
                                                 
1 We calculate 𝐷𝐷2 = 1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷/𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇, where 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇 is the sum of squares of the debt ratio 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷 is 
sum of squares of either the residuals 𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑖,𝑡𝑡 or the composite residuals 𝛼𝛼�𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑖,𝑡𝑡. 
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Size (SIZE) is expected to be positively related with debt levels since larger 
enterprises are more diversified and are expected to go bankrupt less often, while 
smaller firms are usually more opaque as well. Therefore, larger firms are expected to 
show higher levels of financial leverage (Ang et al., 1982; Pettit and Singer, 1985). 
SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of total sales. 
According to Myers (1977) firms with growth potential are considered as riskier and 
will tend to have lower leverage. On the other hand, firms with high growth 
opportunities are more likely to exhaust internal funds and seek external financing 
(Michaelas et al., 1999). Therefore, the relationship of growth (GR) and leverage can 
be either negative or positive. GR is calculated as the annual rate of change in sales. 
In the context of the pecking order theory, SMEs financing decisions generally 
follow a hierarchy, with a preference for internal over external financing and for debt 
over equity (Michaelas at al., 1999; Daskalakis and Psillaki, 2008; Psilaki and 
Daskalakis, 2009). Hence, profitability (PR) is expected to be negatively related to debt 
and is measured as earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. 
Tax considerations are of little attention for SMEs (Pettit and Singer, 1985), because 
these firms are less likely to generate high profits and therefore less likely to use debt, 
or non-debt items for tax shields. However, based on the given higher levels of 
difficulty for small firms to access debt financing, the use of non-debt tax shields 
(NDTS) could be viewed as their main alternative to reduce any tax burdens. Thus, non-
debt tax shields will be either not related or negatively related to debt (Titman and 
Wessels, 1988). NDTS is measured as the ratio of total depreciation expenses to total 
assets. 
Riskier firms (RISK) will have to confront relatively higher levels of difficulty in 
accessing debt financing (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; Titman and Wessels, 1988). 
We therefore expect a negative relationship between risk and leverage. To calculate 
RISK, we consider a three-year rolling window of the standard deviation of earnings 
before interest and taxes. 
The importance of trade credit (NTCS) as a source of short-term financing, 
especially for SMEs is well documented (Ng et al., 1999; Asselbergh, 2002; Guariglia 
and Mateut, 2006). There are two alternative hypotheses in the literature for the use of 
trade credit: the substitution hypothesis and the complementarity hypothesis, and 
evidence shows that during times of tight money, trade credit acts as complement rather 
than substitute to bank credit, providing support for the redistribution effect (Love et 
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al., 2007; Casey and O’Toole, 2014; Psillaki and Eleftheriou, 2015). We thus either 
expect a positive or a negative relationship of trade credit before the crisis, following 
the complementarity or the substitution hypothesis respectively, and a positive 
relationship during the crisis. Regarding NTCS, we follow the net-trade-credit approach 
of Love et al. (2007); we first subtract trade payables from trade receivables and then 
divide by total sales. 
Cash-rich companies (CASHTA) are also expected to have lower debt for two 
reasons. First, risky firms will try to accumulate cash to avoid under-investment issues 
in the future, and second, cash-rich firms will prefer internal financing as explained in 
the pecking theory context. CASHTA is calculated as cash to total assets. 
Last, to capture the fact that each firm faces different interest burden, we consider 
the firm-specific time varying interest burden (FINEXP), expecting a negative 
relationship between the lagged value of financial burden and leverage. We compute 
FINEXP as the financial expenses to sales ratio. 
2.3.3. Macroeconomic factors 
Mokhova and Zinecker (2014) provide an extensive literature review on the specific 
issue of the effect of various macroeconomic factors on corporate capital structure. 
Given that the most common source of external financing for SMEs is commercial 
banks (Colombo and Grilli, 2007; De Bettignes and Brander, 2007) we use credit supply 
(CRED) as one of our macroeconomic variables, expecting a positive relationship 
between credit supply (either expansion during the growth stage or contraction during 
the recessionary stage) and leverage. CRED is the annual growth rate of total credit 
expansion to enterprises and households. 
The inflation rate (INFL) is another widely investigated macroeconomic factor. 
There is conflicting evidence however regarding the effect of inflation on capital 
structure. Bastos et al. (2009) find no effect of inflation on leverage, whereas Frank and 
Goyal (2009) find a positive relation between inflation and market leverage, but no 
relation on book leverage. Hanousek and Shamshur (2011) find that inflation generally 
has a positive influence on leverage, but this effect turns insignificant for certain 
specifications of their model. We take as INFL the annual rate of change of the CPI 
index. 
Another important macroeconomic factor is the interest rate on which firms borrow, 
which represents the cost of debt. Researchers have examined the relation between 
interest rates, firm’s leverage and macroeconomic conditions (e.g. Karpavičius and Yu, 
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2017; Halling and Zechner, 2016; Baum et al., 2009; Frank and Goyal, 2004; Korajczyk 
and Levy, 2003) and the empirical evidence on the relation between firm’s leverage 
and interest rates is varied. Most of the researchers, however, do not approach the 
relationship from the firm’s perspective, namely that firms borrow more money when 
borrowing costs are lower. An exemption is Karpavičius and Yu (2017), who conclude 
that firms do not adjust their capital structures based on interest rates, except when they 
expect a recessionary period. On the other hand, during periods of recession, interest 
rates tend to be lower due to interventions by the Central Bank’s monetary policy, but 
firms also lower their demand for external financing. Thus, the relationship can result 
in a positive sign as firms are reluctant to borrow money even if the interest rates are 
low, as their target ratios are lower. We use the published figures of the Central Bank 
reports, namely the interest rates on outstanding amounts of euro-denominated loans to 
non-financial corporations by maturity. Specifically, since we use three different types 
of leverage, we adjust the interest rate variable (INTR) to each type, meaning that we 
use interest rates for short-term and long-term debt, while the interest rates variable for 
total debt is the average of the two. 
 
2.4. The data 
We use data from published financial statements of SMEs operating in Greece 
during 2004-2014, a period covering both growth and recession. We believe that the 
choice of Greece adds to the particularity of this research effort, since the Greek 
economy simultaneously gathers the following characteristics: (a) a developed 
economy, member of a community of developed economies in terms of financial 
infrastructure, (b) a country where the SMEs sector is relatively more important when 
compared to other economies in EU-28, and mostly (c) because of the clear distinction 
between two different macroeconomic states (growth and recession) that took place 
during 2004-2014 as Greece is the country which is hit perhaps the most severely by 
the recent economic crisis. 
The choice of Greece does not restrict results and conclusions from being 
generalized to economies with similar characteristics. Psillaki and Daskalakis (2009) 
investigate capital structure determination for SMEs in four European countries 
(Greece, Italy, France and Portugal) and conclude that the four countries present similar 
financial and institutional characteristics. They find similarities in the determinants of 
capital structure across their sample countries, attributed to the commonality of the 
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institutional and legal characteristics of the four countries, and ultimately, that firm 
rather than country factors explain differences in the intensity of capital structure 
choices. 
Our data sources are the ICAP database and the Bank of Greece. The ICAP database 
consists of the published financial statements of all companies that are obliged to report 
them (i.e. the companies with legal form of a limited liability company). We drop firms 
whose accounting information is not full for at least four consecutive years and remove 
firms with outliers. Our final sample is thus an unbalanced sample of 17,317 non-
financial SMEs in Greece during the period 2004-2014. Our sample contains 159,030 
observations and 31,457 missing values. We use the databases of the Bank of Greece 
for the macroeconomic variables. 
Our sample contains all business economy sectors except for financial, insurance 
and real estate activities, as is the common practice in the capital structure research 
field. Approximately 72% of the sample firms are micro, 24% small and 4% medium2. 
In terms of the sectoral breakdown, almost 36% of firms are in the wholesale and retail 
trade, 28% in manufacturing, 29% in the service sectors and the remainder 7% in 
construction3. 
We set the cut point between the growth and the recession states in 2009 since it is 
in this year when annual GDP growth rate becomes substantially negative, and firms’ 
average total assets and average total debt also begin to drop. We thus define our growth 
period during 2004-2008 and the recession period during 2009-2014. 
Table 1 presents annual summary statistics (sample mean and standard deviation) of 
the total values of the three forms of debt (total, short-term and long-term) and of the 
firm-specific variables, whereas Figure 1 depicts the data for the macroeconomic 
variables.  
                                                 
2 We follow the European definition of SMEs to differentiate between micro, small and medium firms. 
The respective population percentages for the size criterion in Greece are on average for the examined 
period 96.5% for micro, 3% for small and 0.5% for medium according to the SBA for Europe (Small 
Business Act – European Commission). 
3 On a population basis, 36% of firms are in the wholesale and retail trade, 25% in manufacturing, 27% 
in the service sectors and the remainder 12% in construction. 
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Table 1 
Sample descriptive statistics: firm-specific variables 
Sample mean (MEAN) and standard deviation (SD) of total debt (TDEBT), short-term debt (SDEBT), long-term debt (LDEBT), total debt ratio (TDR), short-term debt ratio (STDR), long-term debt ratio (LTDR), 
asset structure (AS), size (SIZE), growth (GR), profitability (PR), non-debt tax shield (NDTS), risk (RISK), trade credit (NTCS), cash to total assets ratio (CASHTA) and financial expenses ratio (FINEXP). Values 
in bold show maximum values per variable. 
MEAN 
YEAR TDEBT SDEBT LDEBT  TDR STDR LTDR AS SIZE GR PR NDTS RISK NTCS CASHTA FINEXP 
2004 700,997 498,788 202,210  0.181 0.132 0.049 0.680 13.830 0.143 0.038 0.042 0.171 0.064 0.136 0.024 
2005 771,786 544,447 227,339  0.190 0.138 0.052 0.678 13.840 0.101 0.027 0.041 0.096 0.082 0.129 0.026 
2006 876,314 580,862 295,452  0.202 0.143 0.058 0.671 13.909 0.167 0.030 0.039 0.096 0.095 0.131 0.028 
2007 1,005,522 603,954 401,567  0.210 0.141 0.068 0.661 13.999 0.177 0.036 0.037 0.098 0.099 0.133 0.031 
2008 1,150,947 678,515 472,432  0.216 0.143 0.073 0.675 14.042 0.125 0.027 0.036 0.100 0.125 0.125 0.035 
2009 1,147,114 644,604 502,510  0.228 0.143 0.085 0.686 13.906 -0.051 0.013 0.035 0.111 0.159 0.132 0.034 
2010 1,082,271 607,795 474,476  0.215 0.132 0.083 0.698 13.766 -0.045 -0.004 0.035 0.123 0.180 0.125 0.038 
2011 1,049,191 638,687 410,504  0.208 0.135 0.073 0.558 13.904 -0.064 -0.014 0.031 0.146 0.214 0.123 0.049 
2012 1,021,043 571,737 449,306  0.204 0.124 0.080 0.777 13.713 -0.053 -0.019 0.034 0.137 0.246 0.127 0.055 
2013 955,062 512,661 442,401  0.198 0.118 0.080 0.842 13.626 0.059 0.005 0.026 0.127 0.285 0.140 0.063 
2014 988,097 532,304 455,793  0.196 0.115 0.081 0.846 13.743 0.103 0.017 0.025 0.133 0.276 0.146 0.056 
                 
STANDARD DEVIATION 
YEAR TDEBT SDEBT LDEBT  TDR STDR LTDR AS SIZE GR PR NDTS RISK NTCS CASHTA FINEXP 
2004 1,635,911 1,206,993 841,011  0.199 0.171 0.115 0.645 1.576 0.630 0.122 0.047 0.283 0.741 0.163 0.066 
2005 1,763,216 1,299,850 888,452  0.207 0.177 0.120 0.653 1.562 0.607 0.114 0.045 0.177 0.847 0.158 0.087 
2006 1,956,775 1,360,851 1,049,590  0.214 0.181 0.127 0.657 1.568 0.626 0.116 0.044 0.178 0.792 0.158 0.121 
2007 2,232,736 1,375,288 1,353,942  0.220 0.178 0.139 0.653 1.566 0.627 0.119 0.043 0.177 0.745 0.157 0.090 
2008 2,545,584 1,570,068 1,500,557  0.224 0.181 0.141 0.660 1.576 0.606 0.119 0.044 0.172 0.869 0.154 0.105 
2009 2,529,102 1,503,079 1,537,092  0.224 0.177 0.148 0.668 1.586 0.480 0.116 0.041 0.192 0.937 0.159 0.083 
2010 2,500,126 1,551,232 1,489,683  0.226 0.175 0.150 0.685 1.601 0.502 0.122 0.041 0.218 1.025 0.157 0.125 
2011 2,433,389 1,624,583 1,317,444  0.228 0.178 0.144 0.520 1.534 0.561 0.127 0.038 0.246 1.204 0.159 0.346 
2012 2,405,130 1,502,436 1,454,663  0.233 0.174 0.154 0.733 1.623 0.578 0.121 0.040 0.241 1.292 0.161 0.200 
2013 2,355,494 1,380,309 1,511,383  0.238 0.174 0.159 0.769 1.630 0.567 0.113 0.031 0.221 1.571 0.167 0.936 
2014 2,451,995 1,485,046 1,540,900  0.244 0.176 0.162 0.768 1.640 0.582 0.114 0.031 0.233 1.613 0.168 0.352 
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Looking at the relative trends of the three forms of debt in Table 1, total debt and 
short-term debt values rapidly increase until 2008 (and 2009 for long-term debt) and 
start decreasing slowly thereafter, but remain in relatively high values when compared 
with pre-crisis levels. Comparing between short- and long-term debt, the latter more 
than doubles during the growth period while the growth rate for the short-term debt is 
lower; there seems to be a relative preference of the firms towards long-term debt and 
this can be attributed to the relatively lower interest rates for long-term debt (Figure 1). 
Other interesting observations are that growth rates and profitability ratios start 
decreasing from 2008 already and that the net trade credit ratio gradually increases 
throughout the whole period, with an obvious jump during crisis years, which is 
evidence in favour of the redistribution approach.  
Regarding the fluctuations of the macroeconomic variables, credit expansion is 
positive before crisis, drops significantly in 2009 and turns negative during the crisis 
period. There is a peak of inflation in 2010 which was due to the vast increase of VAT 
in an effort of the state to increase their revenues, followed by a gradual decline and 
negative figures thereafter. Last, interest rates peak at 2007-2008 and fluctuate 
thereafter at lower levels. Interestingly, interest rates for long-term loans are lower than 
those of short-term loans and while the latter remain at higher levels during the crisis 
than before the crisis, long-term rates remain at either the same or even at lower levels 
during the crisis, so that there is an increase in spreads between short-term and long-
term interest rates during the crisis. It is worth noting here that, Greece being a member 
of Eurozone, base interest rates are set by the European Central Bank (ECB).  
 
Figure 1 
Annual data on credit expansion (CRED), inflation (INFL), and interest rates of total debt (INTR_TD), 
short-term debt (INTR_SD) and long-term debt (INTR_LD) 
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3. Empirical results 
3.1. Regression results 
The estimation results for model (4) are given in Table 2. Panel A presents the 
estimated coefficients of 𝛿𝛿, 𝛽𝛽 and 𝛾𝛾 for 2005-2008, 𝛿𝛿 + 𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐, 𝛽𝛽 + 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐 and 𝛾𝛾 + 𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐 for 
2009-2014, whereas 𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐, 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐 and 𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐 show the difference between the two periods; the z-
statistic for significance is given in each case. Panel B contains the diagnostic tests and 
their associated p-values, while Panel C the coefficients of determination with and 
without the estimated fixed effects. 
Results show that the main determinant of the debt ratio is its lagged value. The very 
high values of the estimates of the lagged debt ratio clearly suggest that the debt ratio 
exhibits very strong persistence4. A second and more interesting finding however is 
that there seems to be a different pattern regarding the adjustment speeds of short-term 
debt and long-term debt. Specifically, speed adjustments for TDR are 0.078 and 0.071 
for the growth and recessionary periods respectively, but not significantly different, 
0.099 and 0.113 for STDR and also not significantly different, and 0.155 and 0.072 for 
LTDR but significantly different. This shows that the adjustment speed for LTDR slows 
down during the crisis, as predicted by the literature, but the speed adjustment of STDR 
is not affected by states change. These different patterns between the two ratios and the 
respective relationships with their regressors are explored in finer detail later in sections 
3.2 and 3.3.  
We also observe some differences in the behaviour of our regressors in the two 
periods. Given the predominant role of the lagged debt ratio and the collinearity among 
the regressors, the effect of the firm and macro regressors cannot be easily extracted. 
Consequently, in the following section, we not only perform hypothesis testing on the 
individual multiplicative dummy, but also group these dummies across firm and macro 
type. Nevertheless, we find that the firm-specific determinants that maintain a persistent 
and stable effect across states and all forms of debt ratio’s dynamic determination are 
the asset structure and the cash to total assets ratios, while all remaining firm-specific 
ratios are either non-significant or not stable across forms and states. 
                                                 
4 Given that the estimates of the lagged debt ratio were so high, we performed panel unit root tests: the 
z-statistic of Harris and Tzavalis (1999) and the two t-statistics of Im et al. (2003). We applied the tests 
to TDR, LTDR and STDR for the whole sample and the two sub-periods on the full balanced subsample. 
In majority of the cases unit root was rejected, but there were instances that it was not. However, the 
small T sample size makes these results on panel unit roots difficult to interpret. 
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Table 2 
Regression results 
Estimated coefficients of regressors in periods 2005-2008 and 2009-2014, along with the difference 
across these periods. z-statistics for significance in parenthesis. Significant ***at 1%, **at 5%, *at 10%. 
Wald statistic, Arellano-Bond (AB) statistics for the first five lags, Modified Wald (MW) statistic, Sargan 
statistic, Hansen statistic and their p-values in parenthesis. Coefficients of determination 𝐷𝐷2 and 𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛2  
with and without the estimated fixed effects. Sample size: 132,769, number of instruments: 212 for TDR, 
192 for STDR, 224 for LTDR.  
  TDR STDR LTDR 
Panel A: Estimates and z-statistics 
  2005-08 2009-14 Diff. T1 2005-08 2009-14 Diff. T1 2005-08 2009-14 Diff. T1 
L.DR 0.922*** 0.929*** 0.007 0.901*** 0.887*** -0.014 0.855*** 0.928*** 0.073*** 
  (148.51) (234.83) (0.98) (100.36) (140.10) (-1.47) (126.09) (178.55) (9.35) 
L.AS -0.006*** -0.006*** 0.000 -0.003 -0.006*** -0.004** -0.002** -0.003*** -0.001 
  (-4.24) (-6.21) (0.08) (-1.30) (-5.06) (-2.19) (-2.40) (-5.82) (-1.59) 
L.SIZE 0.001** -0.002*** -0.004*** 0.004*** 0.000 -0.004*** 0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** 
  (2.16) (-7.44) (-5.57) (4.55) (-0.62) (-4.64) (-0.33) (-7.40) (-3.19) 
L.GR -0.004 0.000 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.000 0.001** 0.000 -0.001* 
  (-0.91) (-0.01) (0.67) (0.71) (1.19) (0.02) (2.23) (-0.39) (-1.75) 
L.PR 0.029** 0.018** -0.010 0.014 -0.012 -0.027* -0.020*** -0.017*** 0.003 
  (2.33) (2.17) (-0.75) (0.98) (-1.27) (-1.74) (-5.93) (-5.69) (0.73) 
L.NDTS -0.027 -0.006 0.021 -0.052 0.007 0.059* -0.004 -0.023*** -0.018 
  (-1.04) (-0.29) (0.65) (-1.62) (0.30) (1.95) (-0.42) (-2.64) (-1.37) 
L.RISK -0.008** 0.021*** 0.029*** -0.017** 0.012*** 0.029*** 0.001 0.000 -0.001 
  (-2.56) (5.71) (6.04) (-1.97) (3.08) (3.38) (0.83) (0.18) (-0.43) 
L.NTCS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001 
  (0.02) (-0.59) (-0.36) (0.44) (0.96) (0.03) (-0.87) (0.69) (1.13) 
L.CASHTA -0.030*** -0.031*** -0.001 -0.009 -0.017*** -0.008 -0.017*** -0.012*** 0.005* 
  (-5.14) (-7.41) (-0.20) (-1.22) (-3.59) (-1.05) (-7.33) (-6.73) (1.76) 
L.FINEXP -0.004 0.028*** 0.032 0.029 0.003 -0.027 0.028** 0.023** -0.005 
  (-0.15) (2.85) (1.20) (1.04) (0.22) (-1.04) (2.39) (2.01) (-0.35) 
L.CRED 0.193*** 0.079*** -0.115* 0.002 0.048*** 0.046 0.123*** 0.042*** -0.081** 
  (3.34) (9.06) (-1.95) (0.03) (6.11) (0.72) (3.63) (8.16) (-2.36) 
L.INFL -0.238 -0.015 0.223 -0.125 -0.013 0.112 -0.182 -0.001 0.181 
  (-1.22) (-0.73) (1.14) (-0.63) (-0.70) (0.57) (-1.57) (-0.12) (1.56) 
L.INTR -0.284** 0.777*** 1.061*** -0.478*** 0.240*** 0.718*** -0.033 0.499*** 0.532*** 
  (-2.57) (10.80) (8.20) (-4.03) (4.05) (5.45) (-0.52) (11.70) (7.05) 
Panel B: Diagnostic tests and p-values 
  Wald AB(1) AB(2) Wald AB(1) AB(2) Wald AB(1) AB(2) 
  418856 -43.53 5.03 150590 -42.57 5.16 91686 -34.81 1.17 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.243) 
  AB(3) AB(4) AB(5) AB(3) AB(4) AB(5) AB(3) AB(4) AB(5) 
  0.25 1.56 -0.29 1.62 0.86 -1.06 -0.84 1.52 -0.36 
  (0.801) (0.119) (0.769) (0.106) (0.390) (0.291) (0.399) (0.129) (0.721) 
  MW Sargan Hansen MW Sargan Hansen MW Sargan Hansen 
  1.6E+41 904.73 641.74 6.7E+40 514.69 438.23 3.1E+40 1349.95 664.27 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Panel C: Coefficients of determination 
 2005-08 2009-14 2005-14 2005-08 2009-14 2005-14 2005-08 2009-14 2005-14 
𝐷𝐷2 81.4% 84.1% 82.9% 76.2% 75.0% 75.6% 73.8% 84.5% 80.3% 
𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
2  79.0% 82.0% 80.7% 74.1% 72.1% 73.1% 69.5% 82.3% 77.2% 
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Regarding the macroeconomic variables, credit expansion has a persistent and 
relatively strong and positive effect across states and forms of ratios, inflation is 
insignificant and interest rates show an interesting shift from relatively weak and 
negative, as expected, effect before the crisis to strong and positive effect during the 
crisis. This positive effect of interest rates with leverage during crisis reflects the results 
of the study of Karpavičius and Yu (2017), that firms target their leverage ratio at lower 
levels during recessions when interest rates are also decreasing. 
The results from the diagnostic tests are satisfactory. The Wald statistic implies a 
very good fit for all debt ratios, as expected, given the high autoregressive parameter. 
The results of the Arellano-Bond statistics for LTDR find no autocorrelation in the 
residuals and so we used the 1st lag of the predetermined regressors for instruments. 
However, for TDR we find 1st-order autocorrelation and for STDR we find 1st- and 
weak 2nd -order autocorrelation in the error term. To secure that the moment conditions 
are satisfied for GMM estimation, we take the 2nd lag of the predetermined regressors 
for instruments for TDR and the 3rd lag for STDR. It is interesting to notice again the 
differences in the dynamics of the three forms of debt ratio. Shocks to the LTDR die 
out in the same year, while those for STDR seem to last 1 or possible 2 years. 
Consequently, the case for TDR, is between its two counterparts. 
The modified Wald statistic finds severe heteroskedasticity in all cases. This does 
not cause a problem with the estimation, but it does render the Sargan statistic for 
overidentifying restrictions non-robust5. On the other hand, the large number of 
instruments weakens the Hansen statistic for overidentifying restrictions6. For all debt 
ratios, both statistics reject the validity of the moment conditions. However, we cannot 
conclude with certainty if this is the case given the lack of robustness of these statistics. 
Last, we find high coefficients of determination for all debt ratios and periods 
confirming the good fit of the model and in line with the high values of the 
autoregressive parameter. We do not observe much difference between the two 
coefficients of determination 𝐷𝐷2 and 𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛2 , with and without the estimated fixed 
effects. This suggests that unobserved heterogeneity in model (4) is weak. 
 
                                                 
5 Arellano and Bond (1991) and Pitt (2011) report simulations where the Sargan statistic over-rejects in 
the presence of heteroskedasticity. 
6 Bowsher (2002) report simulations where the Hansen statistics under-rejects with a large number of 
instruments in the context of a simple panel autoregressive model. 
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3.2. Multiplicative dummies’ significance between states 
We focus our analysis on the relative importance and the subsequent differences 
between firm-specific and macroeconomic variables, between the macroeconomic 
states of growth and recession, and across the three forms of leverage. We thus perform 
hypothesis testing (denoted as T for each hypothesis below) on the significance of the 
multiplicative dummies. Specifically, we look at the significance of each coefficient, 
  𝐻𝐻0: 𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐 = 0,  𝐻𝐻0: 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 = 0,𝑘𝑘 = 1, … ,𝐾𝐾,  𝐻𝐻0: 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐 = 0, 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽,      T1 
as well as the joint significance of the multiplicative firm and macro dummies, 
  𝐻𝐻0:𝛽𝛽1𝑐𝑐 = ⋯ = 𝛽𝛽𝛫𝛫𝑐𝑐 = 𝛾𝛾1𝑐𝑐 = ⋯ = 𝛾𝛾𝐽𝐽𝑐𝑐 = 0,        T2  
of the multiplicative firm dummies, 
  𝐻𝐻0:𝛽𝛽1𝑐𝑐 = ⋯ = 𝛽𝛽𝛫𝛫𝑐𝑐 = 0            T3 
and of the multiplicative macro dummies, 
  𝐻𝐻0: 𝛾𝛾1𝑐𝑐 = ⋯ = 𝛾𝛾𝐽𝐽𝑐𝑐 = 0.          T4 
On T1, results show (Diff. column in Table 2) that the hypothesis 𝐻𝐻0: 𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐 = 0 is 
rejected for LTDR and not rejected for STDR, meaning that the adjustment speed slows 
down for LTDR during the crisis, but does not change for STDR. Specifically, and as 
discussed before, the adjustment speed for STDR is higher in the recessionary period 
but not significantly different from the growth period, whereas speed adjustment of the 
LTDR significantly slows down during crisis. Regarding TDR, the result for the 
adjustment speed is mainly driven by that for STDR; this is expected given that on 
average STDR forms the bigger part of TDR (see Table 1). 
Concerning the hypotheses 𝐻𝐻0: 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 = 0 and 𝐻𝐻0: 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐 = 0, we reject for 𝑘𝑘 = AS, 
SIZE, PR, NDTS, RISK, 𝑗𝑗 = INTR for STDR; 𝑘𝑘 = SIZE, GR, CASHTA, 𝑗𝑗 = CRED, 
INFL for LTDR; 𝑘𝑘 = SIZE, RISK, 𝑗𝑗 = CRED, INTR for TDR. Hence, there are firm-
specific and macroeconomic regressors that affect differently each of the debt ratios in 
the two states. Interestingly, some regressors that change significantly between states 
for either STDR or LTDR, do not do so for TDR; there seems to be a cancellation effect 
when the two forms of debt are put together in the total one. 
Table 3 reports the results of the hypotheses Τ2, Τ3 and Τ4 respectively. Results 
show that all hypotheses are rejected for all three types of debt ratios. Hence, all the 
multiplicative dummies for firm and macro variables are jointly significant, as well as 
each of the group of the firm and macro multiplicative dummies. Therefore, the effects 
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on debt ratios of firm-specific and macro variables are significantly different between 
the two periods.  
 
Table 3 
Significance of firm and macro multiplicative dummies 
Wald statistics for joint significance and their p-values in parenthesis. 
TDR STDR LTDR 
T2 T3 T4 T2 T3 T4 T2 T3 T4 
172.08 78.73 85.85 79.60 33.46 48.26 117.82 26.57 60.29 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
 
Having found these different effects, we next examine the contributions of the firm 
and macro variables at the sample mean of the debt ratios in each state, as well as 
compare these contributions in absolute terms. Specifically, we evaluate the sample 
mean of the firm and macro variables in each of the two periods and test whether the 
contributions to the mean of debt ratio of the firm and macro variables are significant 
and if the absolute magnitude of these contributions are equal in each period. We test 
the hypotheses: 
  𝐻𝐻0:∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑋𝑋�𝑘𝑘(1)𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘 = 0,  𝐻𝐻0:∑ (𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐)𝑋𝑋�𝑘𝑘(2)𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘 = 0,       Τ5 
  𝐻𝐻0:∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗𝑀𝑀�𝑗𝑗(1)𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗 = 0,  𝐻𝐻0:∑ (𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 + 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐)𝑀𝑀�𝑗𝑗(2)𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗 , = 0        Τ6 
  𝐻𝐻0:∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑋𝑋�𝑘𝑘(1)𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘 = ∑ (𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐)𝑋𝑋�𝑘𝑘(2)𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘 ,        Τ7 
  𝐻𝐻0:∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗𝑀𝑀�𝑗𝑗(1)𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗 = ∑ (𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 + 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐)𝑀𝑀�𝑗𝑗(2)𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗 ,        Τ8 
  𝐻𝐻0: �∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑋𝑋�𝑘𝑘(1)𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘 � = �∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗𝑀𝑀�𝑗𝑗(1)𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗 � and        Τ9 
  𝐻𝐻0: �∑ (𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐)𝑋𝑋�𝑘𝑘(2)𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘 � = �∑ (𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 + 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐)𝑀𝑀�𝑗𝑗(2)𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗 �,       Τ10 
where 𝑋𝑋�𝑘𝑘
(𝑝𝑝) and 𝑀𝑀�𝑗𝑗(𝑝𝑝) are the sample mean of the 𝑘𝑘-th lagged firm regressor and 𝑗𝑗-th 
lagged macro regressor in the 𝑝𝑝-th period, 𝑝𝑝 = 1,2. Table 4 reports the results from 
hypothesis testing T5 to T10. 
Concerning the hypothesis testing T5 and T6, we find that in the growth period 
(2005-08), the contribution of the firm variables to the mean of TDR and LTDR is 
insignificant, but significant for STDR, while that of the macro variables is significant 
for STDR and LTDR and marginally significant (at 10%) for TDR. During recession 
(2009-14), the contribution of the firm and macro variables are significant for all debt 
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ratios, with the exception of the firm variables for STDR where the result is marginally 
significant (at 10%). 
 
Table 4 
Significance of contributions of firm and macro variables 
Wald statistics for restrictions and their p-values in parenthesis. 
 
TDR STDR LTDR 
Firm variables 
2005-08 2009-14 Diff. 2005-08 2009-14 Diff. 2005-08 2009-14 Diff. 
T5 T5 T7 T5 T5 T7 T5 T5 T7 
0.87 68.86 22.27 16.88 2.81 20.57 1.03 69.26 9.20 
(0.351) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.094) (0.000) (0.309) (0.000) (0.002) 
Macro variables 
2005-08 2009-14 Diff. 2005-08 2009-14 Diff. 2005-08 2009-14 Diff. 
T6 T6 T8 T6 T6 T8 T6 T6 T8 
3.09 124.94 12.89 7.82 18.72 16.93 15.01 143.36 3.96 
(0.079) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.047) 
Firm versus macro variables 
2005-08 2009-14 2005-08 2009-14 2005-08 2009-14 
T9 T10 T9 T10 T9 T10 
0.16 228.92 185.41 170.75 971.43 372.70 
(0.694) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Results also show that both hypotheses T7 and T8 are rejected and therefore the 
contributions of the firm and macro variables to the mean are different across the two 
states. Finally, both hypotheses T9 and T10 are rejected in both periods for STDR and 
LTDR, but only for the second period for TDR. Hence, the absolute contribution of the 
firm variables to the mean of STDR and LTDR is different from that of the macro 
variables in both periods. This is also the case for TDR for the recessionary period, but 
not for the growth period. The above results indicate that there is a clear differentiation 
between the dynamic determination of the two forms of debt, short- and long-term. 
Overall, our hypothesis testing suggests that there are significant differences in the 
effect of the regressors (lagged debt ratio, firm-specific and macroeconomic) across the 
two states and between short- and long-term debt ratios. As such, in the next section we 
decompose the sample mean of the debt ratios across the regressors (lagged debt ratio, 
firm-specific and macroeconomic) to compare their contributions. 
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3.3 Mean decomposition 
We analyze the effect on the sample mean of the debt ratio by each of the three 
components:  
• the lagged debt ratio 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 (with its multiplicative dummy),  
• the lagged firm regressors 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 (with their multiplicative dummies),  
• the lagged macro regressors 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1 (with their multiplicative dummies).  
First, we evaluate the average fitted debt ratio and the contribution to this average of 
each of the above three components for each year. In particular, for each 𝑖𝑖 firm and 𝑡𝑡 
year, we calculate the fitted values 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 from model (4) and evaluate the contribution 
from the lagged debt ratio and the two sets of the regressors, that is, the variables 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑙𝑙 = 𝛿𝛿𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡, 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑋𝑋 = ?̂?𝛽′𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + ?̂?𝛽𝑐𝑐′𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 and 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑀𝑀 =
𝛾𝛾�′𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛾�𝑐𝑐′𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡. Last, we average the true values 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, the fitted values 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 and 
the contributions 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑙𝑙, 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑋𝑋, 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑀𝑀 across firms for each year 𝑡𝑡, denoting these 
averages by 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷����𝑡𝑡. 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑡𝑡, 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑡𝑡,𝑙𝑙, 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑡𝑡,𝑋𝑋 and 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑡𝑡,𝑀𝑀. Notice that 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑡𝑡 = 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑡𝑡,𝑙𝑙 + 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑡𝑡,𝑋𝑋 +
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑡𝑡,𝑀𝑀. Results are presented in Table 5 below. 
 
Table 5 
Decomposing the mean of debt ratio 
Average debt ratio, averaged fitted debt ratio and the three components (lagged debt ratio, firm and macro 
variables) 
  TDR   STDR   LTDR 
  𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷����𝑡𝑡 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑡𝑡 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑡𝑡,𝑙𝑙 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑡𝑡,𝑋𝑋 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑡𝑡,𝑀𝑀  𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷����𝑡𝑡 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑡𝑡 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑡𝑡,𝑙𝑙 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑡𝑡,𝑋𝑋 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑡𝑡,𝑀𝑀  𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷����𝑡𝑡 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑡𝑡 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑡𝑡,𝑙𝑙 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑡𝑡,𝑋𝑋 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑡𝑡,𝑀𝑀 
2005 0.193 0.193 0.169 0.008 0.015  0.141 0.138 0.121 0.049 -0.031  0.052 0.055 0.043 -0.005 0.017 
2006 0.205 0.204 0.177 0.009 0.018  0.146 0.145 0.126 0.050 -0.031  0.059 0.058 0.044 -0.005 0.019 
2007 0.212 0.212 0.188 0.009 0.015  0.142 0.147 0.131 0.051 -0.034  0.070 0.063 0.050 -0.005 0.018 
2008 0.219 0.219 0.195 0.009 0.015  0.144 0.142 0.128 0.051 -0.037  0.075 0.074 0.060 -0.005 0.019 
2009 0.233 0.231 0.203 -0.037 0.065  0.145 0.145 0.127 -0.007 0.025  0.088 0.088 0.070 -0.020 0.038 
2010 0.220 0.223 0.215 -0.037 0.045  0.134 0.136 0.128 -0.008 0.016  0.086 0.086 0.081 -0.020 0.025 
2011 0.213 0.213 0.209 -0.036 0.039  0.138 0.138 0.131 -0.006 0.014  0.075 0.074 0.072 -0.019 0.021 
2012 0.212 0.207 0.198 -0.035 0.045  0.138 0.133 0.123 -0.006 0.015  0.075 0.074 0.069 -0.019 0.024 
2013 0.204 0.201 0.191 -0.035 0.046  0.130 0.128 0.118 -0.006 0.016  0.073 0.073 0.067 -0.019 0.025 
2014 0.196 0.192 0.183 -0.037 0.046   0.115 0.112 0.105 -0.007 0.015   0.080 0.080 0.073 -0.019 0.026 
 
 
 
Combining the results of Tables 4 and 5, we conclude the following: 
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Regarding TDR, the contribution of the firm variables to the average TDR is positive 
(but insignificant, see T5) in the first period and turns negative (and significant, see T5) 
in the second period, with the change across the two periods being negative (and 
significant, see T7). The contribution of the macro variables to the average TDR is 
positive (and marginally significant, see T6) in the first period and is positive (and 
significant, see T6) in the second period, with the change across the two periods being 
positive (and significant, see T8). The contribution of the macro variables is slightly 
higher in the first period than that of the firm variables (but the difference is 
insignificant, see T9), while in the second period the contribution of the macro variables 
is higher in absolute value than that of the firm variables (and the difference is 
significant, see T10). 
On STDR, the contribution of the firm variables to the average STDR is positive 
(and insignificant, see T5) in the first period and turns negative (and marginally 
significant, see T5) in the second period, with the change across the two periods being 
negative (and significant, see T7). The contribution of the macro variables to the 
average STDR is negative (and significant, see T6) in the first period and is positive 
(and significant, see T6) in the second period, with the change across the two periods 
being positive (and significant, see T8). The contribution of the firm variables is higher 
in absolute value than that of the macro variables n the first period (and the difference 
is significant, see T9), while in the second period the contribution of the macro variables 
is higher in absolute value than that of the firm variables (and the difference is 
significant, see T10). 
Last, on LTDR, the contribution of the firm variables to the average LTDR is 
negative (but insignificant, see T5) in the first period and becomes even more negative 
(and significant, see T5) in the second period, with the change across the two periods 
being negative (and significant, see T7). The contribution of the macro variables to the 
average LTDR is positive (and significant, see T6) in both periods, with the change 
across the two periods being positive (and significant, see T8). The contribution of the 
firm variables is higher in absolute value than that of the macro variables (and the 
difference is significant, see T9), while in the second period the contribution of the 
macro variables is higher in absolute value than that of the firm variables in the first 
period (and the difference is significant, see T10). Note also that for all forms of debt, 
the average of the fitted values of the debt ratio is very close to the average of the true 
debt ratio, confirming again the good fit of the model. 
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3.4. Robustness checks 
In this section, we discuss the results of our robustness checks 1 to 7 as described in 
Section 2.2. Table 6 shows the differences between the p-values of our model (4) and 
the respective check, for the ten T tests (Section 3.2). We do not report the differences 
in p-values for each coefficient of the firm-specific and macroeconomic variables for 
the sake of brevity, but we discuss the main conclusions of any changes in each test.  
 
Table 6 
Differences between the p-values of the model and the respective check for T1-T10 
* denotes marginal difference: the p-value was <1% and turns 1%<p<10% or the p-value was slightly above 10% and turns 
1%<p<5%. 
** denotes critical difference, namely when a non-significant/significant p-value turns significant/non-significant. 
 TDR STDR LTDR 
 T1 T2 T3 T4 T7 T8 T9 T10 T1 T2 T3 T4 T7 T8 T9 T10 T1 T2 T3 T4 T7 T8 T9 T10 
Check 1                         
Check 2              *  **         
Check 3         *                
Check 4                   **  ** **   
Check 5 - - - - - -   - - - - - -   - - - - - -   
Check 7   **  ** ** **    **  * **     *  **    
                         
 TDR STDR LTDR 
 T5 T6 T5 T6 T5 T6 
 2005-08 2009-14 2005-08 2009-14 2005-08 2009-14 2005-08 2009-14 2005-08 2009-14 2005-08 2009-14 
Check 1      **       
Check 2   **   ** ** **   *  
Check 3      **       
Check 4      **   **    
Check 5   **  **    **    
Check 7 **    **  **  **    
 
The table shows that conclusions remain unchanged in terms of p-values for most of 
the hypotheses and most of the checks. The only persistent change in p-value is noted 
for T5 and the STDR, during the crisis, where p-value turns insignificant. T5 measures 
the contribution of the firm variables to debt ratios at the mean. Note that T5 was 
marginally significant in our model during the crisis for the STDR, and now turns 
insignificant, implying that the contribution of firm variables to the mean debt ratio 
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could be even less important; this reinforces our main finding, namely that the 
contribution of firm variables to the mean is even less important during the crisis. The 
effects of each check individually are discussed in the sub-sections that follow. 
 
3.4.1. Check 1: Allow for maximum lag in the instruments 
We use all available lags (passed the one lag used in Table 3) to instrument the 
predetermined regressors in the difference equation in the system GMM estimation. 
The z-statistics for each coefficient remain largely stable, except for a few firm and 
macro regressors that are border-line significant/insignificant. Conclusions from the 
hypothesis testing T1-T10 remain unchanged, except for T5 for STDR, which turns 
insignificant. 
 
3.4.2. Check 2: Use a full balanced subsample of the data 
We create a balanced subsample of the data. The total number of observations is 
approximately half of the unbalanced sample. The results from the z-statistics for each 
coefficient are similar to those in Table 3, except for some firm and macro regressors 
that are border-line significant/insignificant. We observe some differences in 
hypotheses testing, most of which refer to STDR. Nevertheless, we still observe similar 
patterns in that for all debt ratios the effects of firm and macro variables are different 
across the two states, and during the crisis period the macroeconomic variables are more 
important than firm ones, except for STDR where the two sets of variables have the 
same effect. 
 
3.4.3. Check 3: Εxamine firms with total debt ratio less than 100% 
Our sample contains 202 firms (approximately 1% of the sample) that have total 
debt of more than 100% at least for one year. Thus, the effects when we remove these 
firms are minor. All the z-statistics provide the same conclusions, expect for very few 
regressors that are border-line significant/insignificant. Conclusions from hypothesis 
testing T1-T10 are the same, except for T5 for STDR as noted above and a marginal 
difference in p-value for T1 for STDR. 
 
3.4.4. Check 4: Consider only firms with non-zero debt 
We examine firms with non-zero debt (total, short or long in each case) for all 
available years. We drop 2,357, 3,472 and 7,255 firms for TDR, STDR and LTDR, 
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representing 14%, 20% and 42% of the sample size respectively. The z-statistics for 
each coefficient remain largely unaffected, except for few firm regressors that are 
border-line significant/insignificant. Regarding hypotheses testing, the main affect 
seems to be on the LTDR, since T3, T7 and T8 turn insignificant. Nonetheless, we still 
observe similar patterns in that for all debt ratios the effects of firm and macro variables 
are different across the two states, and during the crisis the macroeconomic variables 
are more important than the firm-specific variables. 
 
3.4.5. Check 5: Split the sample in the two periods 
We break the sample period into the two states. The sample size drops significantly, 
especially in the first shorter period, which results in some sensitivity. The z-statistics 
are affected for some of the firm and macro regressors. Note that the dummies are not 
included in this check, so that hypothesis testing for T1-T4 and T7-T8 cannot be 
performed. Regarding the remaining tests the conclusions are the same except for T5 
for STDR and LTDR, which turn insignificant and significant respectively, and T6 for 
TDR which turns insignificant. However, we can still conclude that macroeconomic 
regressors play a more crucial role that firm ones during the recession. 
 
3.4.6. Check 6: Replace the macro regressors by year dummies 
We replace the macroeconomic regressors by time dummies and thus testing 
hypotheses T1-T10 are not relevant in our analysis to compare firm vs. macro variables. 
The z-statistics for each coefficient remain largely unaffected, except for few regressors 
that are border-line significant/insignificant. An exception is the regressors for the size, 
which is likely due to the fact that size has by far the lowest coefficient of variation of 
all regressors. 
 
3.4.7. Check 7: Consider different break point of when the crisis occurs. 
Last, we change the break point of our sample from 2009 to 2008 to reflect the year 
of the global financial crisis. We observe the largest sensitivity in this check compared 
to all other checks, which is expected, as in 2008 the Greek economy was not in 
recession and credit conditions were stable (see Figure 1). So, the sensitivity that we 
find could be due to misspecifying the break point. Nonetheless, most of our 
conclusions still remain valid: for all debt ratio forms, the macroeconomic regressors 
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have different effect across the two states, and are also more important during the crisis 
period. 
 
3.5. Summary of the results 
In summary, our results show that there are differences between the effects of the 
firm and macro variables across the two states and for all debt ratios, with a tendency 
that macro contributions to the mean of debt ratio to become more important than the 
firm-specific variables during recession. Overall, firm variables are more important in 
determining STDR in the growth period, while macro variables increase their 
importance in the recessionary period. As regards LTDR, macro variables are more 
important than firm variables in determining the ratio in the entire sample period, and 
become even more important during the crisis. These results imply that the specificities 
of short-term vs. long-term debt should be considered in capital structure analyses and 
results and conclusions should not be based solely on total debt. 
4. Conclusions and Discussion 
Recent literature in capital structure has shed light on adjustment speed in a context 
of changing macroeconomic states (Cook and Tang, 2010; Öztekin and Flannery, 
2012). However, all studies have focused on listed companies, while small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) have not yet been explored. This is surprising, given the importance 
of SMEs for all national economies. Furthermore, no study has so far examined the 
relative importance of firm-specific vs. macroeconomic variables in changes in 
macroeconomic states. This is the main objective of the paper, namely to investigate 
whether and how the effect and contribution of firm-specific and macroeconomic 
variables on capital structure determination of SMEs, change in different 
macroeconomic states. 
We first find that the main determinant of the debt ratio is its lagged value, across 
all three forms of leverage (short-term, long-term and total), so that the remaining firm 
and macroeconomic factors play a secondary role in their dynamic determination. 
Furthermore, short-term and long-term debt ratios follow different patterns regarding 
their adjustment speeds, where the adjustment speed for LTDR slows down during the 
crisis, while that of STDR is not affected. We also conclude that there is a clear 
differentiation of the effects and the contribution of the firm-specific vs. the 
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macroeconomic variables for both STDR and LTDR between the two states. 
Specifically, firm variables are more important in determining STDR in the growth 
period than macro variables, while macro variables increase their importance in the 
recessionary period. As regards LTDR, macro variables are more important than firm 
variables in determining the ratio in the entire sample period, and become even more 
important during the crisis. Given these clear differentiations between the two forms of 
debt, there is no point in drawing conclusions on the total debt ratio and we thus drop 
our conclusions on TDR. Our conclusions are robust to most of the checks, since our 
conclusions remain unchanged. The only persistent change is noted for STDR, 
implying that the contribution of firm variables to the mean could be even less 
important during the crisis.  
We thus provide evidence that the nature and maturity of borrowing itself affects the 
persistence and endurance of the relationship between determinants and borrowing, in 
line with the general approach of differentiating between short-term and long-term debt 
for SMEs (Koeter-Kant and Hernandez-Canovas, 2011; García-Teruel, and Martínez-
Solano, 2010; Michaelas et al., 1999). Assuming that the firm-specific factors are 
internal to the firm meaning that managers have a certain level of control upon these 
factors, while there is no such control over the macroeconomic variables, our results 
imply that SMEs’ managers have very low levels of flexibility to alter the capital 
structure of the firms they manage during the crisis. In other words, SMEs are 
particularly vulnerable during the crisis on how their capital structure is being 
determined.  
Our study implies that the capital structure puzzle, which was rightfully referred to 
as such by Myers (1984), is a multi-dimensional riddle that is simultaneously affected 
by the inherent specificities of the following contrasting pairs: (a) large enterprises vs. 
SMEs, (b) growth vs. recessionary states, (c) short-term vs. long-term debt and (d) 
countries’ specificities vs. similarities. Regarding the practical implications of our 
study, when viewed by a managerial perspective, a cumbersome capital structure can 
be seen as an impediment in value maximization. When viewed by a regulatory 
perspective, this implies that regulators should provide the context within which a 
financial environment can exist, where better institutions will lead to lower transaction 
costs and higher adjustment speed of capital structure. Furthermore, this flexible 
financial environment is of higher importance for SMEs, when compared to large 
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enterprises, since the former are relatively more constrained in access to finance and 
thus more vulnerable in macroeconomic state changes. 
A main limitation is that our results apply to the specificities of one particular 
country, meaning that conclusions are restricted to economies that share similar 
characteristics with Greece. Additionally, the depth and persistence of the economic 
recession in Greece may seem as an extreme environment that is unlikely to be observed 
in developed economies in the near future; on the other hand, this specific environment 
is perhaps the ideal context to test this particular problem in question, since the two 
individual macroeconomic states are distinctively different. Future research could 
investigate whether capital structure determinants behave differently in economies with 
different levels of financial integration and milder differences in macroeconomic states.   
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